Cessation of activity benefit of Spanish self-employed workers: a heterogeneous impact evaluation by Moral-Arce, Ignacio et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Cessation of activity benefit of Spanish
self-employed workers: a heterogeneous
impact evaluation
Ignacio Moral-Arce and Javier Mart´ın-Roma´n and A´ngel L.
Mart´ın-Roma´n
Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal, Universidad
Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia, Universidad de Valladolid
10 March 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85111/
MPRA Paper No. 85111, posted 12 March 2018 09:44 UTC
Cessation of activity benefit of Spanish self-
employed workers: a heterogeneous impact 
evaluation 
 
 
Ignacio Moral-Arce 
Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal 
ignacio.moral@airef.es 
 
 
Javier Martín-Román 
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia 
jmartin@cee.uned.es 
 
 
Ángel L. Martín-Román* 
Universidad de Valladolid 
angellm@eco.uva.es 
 
Abstract 
 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of a public policy implemented through the 
Spanish Social Security system: the Cessation of Activity Benefit (CAB) for self-employed 
workers. Making use of the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (MCVL) and by means of 
a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology, our results show that, when we do not 
take into account heterogeneity in the treatment, self-employed workers receiving CAB 
experience non-employment spells between 22 and 33 logarithmic points longer than their 
not entitled counterparts. We also detect that this difference is not constant but depends on 
the likelihood of being treated. We believe that the two traditional problems that affect the 
insurance markets, consequence of the asymmetric information, adverse selection and 
moral hazard, are behind these results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of a public policy 
implemented through the Spanish Social Security system: the specific 
system of protection due to cessation of activity of self-employed workers or 
Cessation of Activity Benefit (CAB). More precisely, in this research we 
focus on the effects of duration concerning spells of non-employment of 
Spanish self-employed workers who receive CAB. The evaluation of public 
policies is a question increasingly important within the European Union 
agenda, and Spain is not the exception. Furthermore, the results obtained in 
this piece of research are particularly relevant since the Social Security 
budget is nowadays a hot political issue in Spain and other European 
countries. Public administration finances are currently under public 
scrutiny due to the question of their sustainability. The conclusions 
achieved in this article could help remove inefficiencies in the assessed 
policy, which in turn would contribute to improved management of the 
Social Security budget. 
 
In any case, we strongly believe that the evaluation has to be 
rigorous, and with this aim in mind, we make use of impact evaluation 
techniques in order to obtain the results and the economic policy 
recommendations. To be more specific, the methodology used is Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM). This technique allows us to establish a “correct 
comparison” between treated individuals by the policy and their non-treated 
counterparts. By “correct comparison” we mean that we eliminate the 
selection bias conditioned to the observable variables included within our 
database. Thus, by means of this quasi-experimental econometric technique 
we would be getting closer to the idea of a random experiment, which is 
considered the best option to evaluate a policy, but in few occasions can be 
carried out. It is also worth mentioning that we not only estimate the 
average impact of public intervention, but also the heterogeneous effects as 
a consequence of the different likelihood of being treated. This methodology, 
originally proposed by Lechner (2002), provides us with some relevant 
insights. 
 
We use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (“Muestra Continua 
de Vidas Laborales”, MCVL), a microeconomic dataset based on 
administrative records. This database allows us to analyze the labor 
trajectories of self-employed workers after a cessation of activity event. The 
period from the cessation of activity to a new appearance in the MCVL 
records as a self-employed worker, as a salary worker or as an individual 
receiving a retirement pension is considered non-employment time. It is 
worth mentioning that the concepts “unemployment” and “non-employment” 
will be used as synonyms throughout the paper, despite the fact that the 
former has an active job-search connotation whereas the latter does not. The 
MCVL records do not allow us to know if such active job-search is going on, 
but it is possible to identify jobless spells for the analyzed individuals. This 
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is why we employ both concepts as synonyms to label those individuals 
without a job (regardless their job-search activity). 
 
The CAB program, which will be explained in detail later, is 
essentially a public insurance system. Its main objective is to provide self-
employed workers with an income in the event that the cessation of activity 
occurs. At first glance, this program may be conflated with unemployment 
benefits (UB) that wage earners receive when they experience an 
unemployment episode in their labor history. And it is true that this public 
insurance shares some common features with unemployment benefits. 
Nonetheless, the CAB has its own distinct characteristics. To better 
understand this we briefly review the two well-established problems 
affecting insurance markets, consequence of the information asymmetry 
between the insured and the insurer: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
 
In this context, the first one, adverse selection, would entail that “low-
quality” self-employed workers would have greater economic incentives to 
take out an insurance policy than “high-quality” self-employed workers. 
Evidently, by “low-quality” we mean those self-employed workers with a 
higher likelihood of failure in their business ventures. As mentioned, the 
CAB is a public insurance, however it should also be pointed out that self-
employed workers could choose to enter the insurance scheme by paying the 
corresponding insurance fees, or opt out of it. This feature implies an 
important difference when it is compared to the UB for wage earners, due to 
the fact that the Social Security compels both the firm and worker to pay a 
premium for it in the form of payroll taxes. Therefore, there is neither 
willfulness nor discretional ability in this second case. The result of this 
institutional characteristic of the CAB is that the problems linked to 
adverse selection might be potentially serious, whereas they should be 
theoretically negligible within a compulsory insurance scheme like the 
unemployment benefit. 
 
Moral hazard is the second issue. Here, we refer to this concept as the 
change in self-employed worker’s behavior due to the fact of being insured. 
Indeed, the self-employed worker might carry out opportunistic behavior 
attempting to take advantage of the public insurance scheme. We deem that 
three different types of moral hazard could be operating associated with the 
CAB: (1) “ex ante incidence moral hazard”, this entails some self-employed 
workers covered by the insurance making risky decisions, bankruptcy being 
a greater likelihood (triggering the cessation of activity); (2) “ex post 
incidence moral hazard”, which would imply that those insured self-
employed workers could cease their activity more easily (within their 
leeway) than those without insurance coverage; (3) “ex post duration moral 
hazard”, which would lead to an “unjustified” lengthening of the non-
employment period in the case of those self-employed workers under the 
CAB coverage. Due to the main aim of this paper, the last type of moral 
hazard is the one that concerns us. However, the other two categories of 
moral hazard could affect our results as well. 
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According to the theoretical effects mentioned above, we might expect 
the existence of opportunistic behavior among some self-employed workers 
covered by the CAB. To put it in other words, we could anticipate a higher 
incidence of cessation of activity events and longer non-employment spells 
when comparing individuals covered by the insurance to those without 
coverage. Our main interest is precisely this second dimension. We may 
state that our empirical evidence points in that direction: on average, self-
employed workers under the CAB coverage remain non-employed between 
22% and 34% more time than those without this insurance scheme. 
 
As far as we know, this is the first impact evaluation of the CAB 
program for Spain. What is more, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first impact evaluation of a similar program in Europe. Although there is 
some literature analyzing different aspects of self-employment and its 
consequences for the Spanish labor market, both from a microeconomic 
perspective (e.g. Cueto and Mato, 2006; Muñoz-Bullón and Cueto, 2011; 
Cueto et al., 2017) and from a macroeconomic standpoint (e.g. Congregado et 
al., 2010; Carmona et al., 2012; Congregado et al., 2012; Cueto et al. 2015), 
none of these papers has addressed the topic studied here. From a wider 
geographical viewpoint, there have been some authors who recently have 
examined, by means of quasi-experimental designs, public policies 
promoting self-employment as a way out of unemployment (e.g. 
Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008; Caliendo, 2009; Rodriguez-Planas and 
Benus, 2010; Caliendo and Künn, 2011, 2014; Behrenz et al., 2016; Caliendo 
et al., 2016). However, this strand of research, although sharing the same 
group analyzed here (self-employed workers), has a very different goal. Our 
interest here coincides much more with that of the literature examining the 
effects of the UB on the duration of unemployment spells in the case of 
salaried workers (Carling et al., 2001; Røed and Zhang, 2003; Van Ours and 
Vodopivec, 2006; Lalive et al., 2006; Card et al., 2007; Lalive, 2008; Uusitalo 
and Verho, 2010; Schmieder et al., 2012; Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez, 
2015; Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2016). Nonetheless, and as 
mentioned above, our goal here is rather different from the previous studies. 
The particular institutional characteristics of the CAB program make this 
impact evaluation particularly appealing for policy makers due to the 
implications for the Social Security budget. 
 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts the 
institutional framework in which this public policy is implemented. Section 
3 reviews the related literature. The database we use is discussed in section 
4. In section 5, the methodology employed is explained. Section 6 is devoted 
to a preliminary descriptive analysis. The main results obtained are shown 
in section 7. Section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Institutional Framework 
 
The policy to be evaluated is the CAB. Law 32/2010, of August 5 (developed 
by Royal Decree 1541/2011, of October 31), which establishes a specific 
system of protection for Spanish self-employed workers, finishes the recent 
transformation of the legal standards for the promotion and support of self-
employment in Spain. Previously, Law 20/2007, of July 11, of the Statute of 
the self-employed worker, had taken the first steps in this direction. It 
should also be noted that Law 32/2010 was amended with the new Law on 
Benefit Societies (Law 35/2014, of December 26, amending the consolidated 
text of the General Law of the Spanish Social Security system in relation to 
the legal regime of the Benefit Societies of Workplace Accidents and 
Occupational Diseases of the Spanish Social Security system). Its regulatory 
development is still pending1. 
 
This legal standard is intended to provide some benefits in the case of 
total involuntary cessation of activities, either temporary or permanent, to 
Spanish self-employed workers affiliated with and enrolled in the Special 
Regime for Self-Employed Workers (RETA, in Spanish) or in the Special 
Regime for Workers of the Sea. In both cases, however, there is a 
requirement: to have paid for the above-mentioned benefit2. In this sense, it 
could be said that the benefit examined shares the same objectives as the 
ones for the unemployment benefits of people employed by someone else 
(more simply, the so-called salaried workers).  
 
Nevertheless, there are also some remarkable differences between 
these two social protection systems. One of them is the voluntary nature of 
the CAB scheme, that is, regarding the question of the subscription, the self-
employed workers have to make a decision: to pay contributions or not. In 
this regard, it should be noted that the CAB program is exclusively financed 
by the tax collection from the contributions of this group. 
 
Initially, the coverage of the protection by cessation was linked to the 
protection of the professional contingencies of the self-employed workers, 
that is, those workers who paid contributions for professional contingencies 
had to do it by cessation of activity as well. Nonetheless, the amendment of 
the Law on Benefit Societies, approved in 2014 (Law 35/2014, of December 
26) changes this aspect and makes the protection voluntary. There is no 
doubt that this legislative modification may result in important economic 
effects. The starting link between the protection for professional 
contingencies with the one related to cessation of activity made it possible to 
increase the number of people covered and to diversify the risk associated to 
the contingency of the cessation. After the reform, is likely to observe a 
                                                          
1 See Moral-Arce (2016). 
2 The RETA offers coverage to workers who perform a regular, personal and direct economic 
activity for profit, without being subject to a work contract. 
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reduction in the number of contributors and an increase in the incidence of 
the benefit. 
 
The compensation of interest is managed by mutual insurance 
companies, partners of the Spanish Social Security, the Spanish Public 
State Employment Service (SEPE, in Spanish) and the Spanish Social 
Institute of the Navy. These mutual insurance companies are responsible 
for protecting workers who are affiliated with them (approximately 89% of 
the people covered by the CAB system). The entity charged with overseeing 
those workers not affiliated with a mutual insurance company is SEPE 
(about 9.5% of the workers covered) or the Social Institute of the Navy in the 
case of workers from the Special Regime of the Sea (the remaining 1.5% of 
the workers covered). A remarkable fact is that this shared management, 
between the Spanish Social Security System and the SEPE, is an exception 
with respect to other benefits. 
 
Bearing in mind the importance of the mutual insurance companies 
working together with the Spanish Social Security in the management of 
the CAB scheme, it would be necessary to clarify that they are associations 
of entrepreneurs of a private nature, non-profit, whose exclusive purpose is 
to collaborate in the administration of the following benefits for workers: (1) 
Economic and health benefits derived from occupational contingencies 
(workplace accidents and occupational diseases); (2) Economic benefits of 
temporary disabilities for common contingencies; (3) Risk-benefits during 
pregnancy and breastfeeding; (4) Child-care benefits in case of cancer or 
serious illness; and (5) Benefits for the cessation of activities of self-
employed workers. 
 
In the development of this collaboration they manage contributions of 
the system that are regularly transferred from the Spanish General 
Treasury of Social Security. On the other hand, they are also assigned some 
real estate of the Spanish Social Security. At present, there are twenty 
mutual insurance companies of this type. 
 
Regarding the requirements to receive the benefits analyzed, we 
should point out that the following five criteria must be met simultaneously: 
(1) to be enrolled in the Spanish Social Security system; (2) to cover the 
minimum period of contribution (12 months); (3) to be in legal status of 
cessation of activity; (4) not having reached the stipulated age to qualify for 
the retirement pension, unless the self-employed worker had not proved the 
required period of contribution; and (5) to be up-to-date with Spanish Social 
Security contributions. 
 
Therefore, a key legal concept to receive the CAB is “to be in legal 
status of cessation of activity". In general, this situation occurs in the 
following scenarios: (1) By the concurrence of economic, technical, 
productive or organizational reasons. In case of an establishment open to 
the public, it will be required to close it during the receipt of the service or 
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its transmission to third parties. It is understood that these motives are 
fulfilled if they exist (or it exists): (1a) Losses in a full year, exceeding 10% of 
the incomes obtained in the same period, excluding the first year of 
beginning of the activity; (1b) Claiming of debts by taking administrative 
steps if it involves, at least, 30% of the incomes from the previous year; or 
(1c) judicial declaration in case of bidding process. (2) By force majeure, 
determinant of the temporary or definitive cessation of the activity. (3) Loss 
of administrative license, provided that it is a requirement for the exercise 
of the activity and is not motivated by the Spanish commission of criminal 
infractions. (4) Assumptions of gender violence when they involve the 
cessation of activity (either temporary or definitive). (5) By divorce or 
marital separation, by means of judicial decision, in the cases in which the 
self-employed worker can take advantage of family allowances for assistance 
in the business. (6) By involuntary cessation in the position of adviser or 
administrator of a company or in the rendering of services to it, when the 
company has incurred losses above 10% of its incomes or has decreased its 
net worth below two thirds of the social capital. (7) The economically 
dependent self-employed workers who cease their activity by terminating 
the contract signed with the client on which they depend. 
 
It is necessary to clarify that in no circumstances will it be considered 
a legal situation of cessation of activity for those workers who cease, or 
voluntarily interrupt, their activity. Nor will it be considered legal if the 
dependent self-employed workers who, after finishing their relationship 
with the client and receive the benefit, re-contract with the same client 
within one year from the moment the benefit is exhausted. In such a case 
they are required to refund the benefit received. 
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting two characteristics of the CAB 
scheme: the amount and the duration of the service. In connection with the 
amount, it should be pointed out that the right that makes a self-employed 
worker eligible for the CAB includes an economic compensation and the 
payment of social security contributions for common contingencies and 
temporary disability. In general, the amount of the benefit is 70% of the 
average of the contribution bases of the previous 12 months of the activity 
with a limit that varies according to the family burdens. 
 
However, there are maximum and minimum limits that are based on 
the Public Indicator of Multiple Effects Income (IPREM, in Spanish) and the 
number of children supported by the self-employed worker. Table 1 
summarizes this casuistry. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
As regards the second of the points previously mentioned, it should be 
noted that the duration of the benefit depends on the period of contribution 
and the age of the self-employed worker. In order to determine the period of 
coverage, the contribution of the 48 months prior to the cessation of activity 
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is taken into consideration. Of this total, 12 months must be continuous and 
immediately previous to the cessation. Moreover, two different situations 
can be identified: the general case and the one of self-employed workers over 
60 years old. 
 
Table 2 shows the relationship between the period of contribution and 
the period of protection in the two situations already described. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
3. State of the art 
 
This paper is related to several strands of literature. On the one hand, this 
piece of research contributes to the pool of knowledge concerning the effects 
of self-employment on the overall labor market. On the other hand, we could 
also affirm that, due to the empirical methodology employed here, our paper 
is linked to that relatively recent literature making use of quasi-
experimental designs to obtain the results. In this sense, it might be 
stressed that there are a number of new papers that analyze the self-
employment start-up programs as a way out of unemployment by means of 
this type of methodology. Furthermore, it could be stated that this work is 
even more connected with the bibliography analyzing the disincentive 
effects of public insurance schemes in the labor market. The bibliography 
examining opportunistic behavior of salaried workers when receiving UB is 
substantial. In contrast, this paper is a contribution to the scant research on 
the opportunistic behavior carried out by self-employed workers when 
receiving a public benefit while not working. 
 
According to the conventional view, one person decides to become self-
employed by comparing costs and benefits of doing so (see, for instance, Rees 
and Shah, 1986; De Wit and Van Winden, 1989; Johansson, 2000; 
Hammarstedt, 2006; Hammarstedt and Shukur, 2009; Congregado et al., 
2012). Within this theoretical framework, it is common to distinguish 
between “opportunity entrepreneurs” and “necessity entrepreneurs”. The 
former are individuals who become self-employed as a consequence of “pull” 
factors, i.e. where the aim for doing so is to explore business opportunities 
(see, for example, Dennis, 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dawson et 
al., 2009; Millán et al., 2014). The latter are workers that go into self-
employment because of the lack of alternative employment opportunities, 
that is, due to what the literature has labelled “push” factors (e.g. Storey 
and Johnson, 1987; Persson, 2004; Congregado et al., 2010; Dawson and 
Henley, 2012). 
 
Self-employment is at the same time an important part of total 
employment in the labor markets of most countries. Based on figures from 
the OECD, we may state that 16.1% of total employment is made up of self-
employed workers in the EU28 in 2015, being that percentage 15.6% in the 
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Eurozone and 17.3% in Spain. Perhaps because of this quantitative 
importance, the analysis of the effects of entrepreneurship in the labor 
market has attracted much attention in recent research. A variety of aspects 
regarding self-employment have been investigated, both from a 
macroeconomic and a microeconomic perspective. 
 
From a microeconomic standpoint, and with a European perspective, 
we found some papers studying the relationship between self-employment 
and the labor market. Román et al. (2011) analyses whether the strict 
regulation of employment protection encourages employers to contract out 
work to their own paid employees by the formula of dependent self-
employment, of which evidence was found. Millán et al. (2012) investigates 
the determinants of self-employment survival in Europe. One of their 
findings is that entering self-employment from unemployment has a strong 
negative effect on survival within self-employment. Román et al. (2013) 
questions whether start-up incentives are really an entrepreneur policy or 
rather an active labor market program. In conducting that research, they 
investigate the underlying determinants of an individual's decision to switch 
from unemployment to self-employment in Europe and highlight three 
essential dimensions: (1) the existing heterogeneity within self-employment 
(employers vs. own-account workers); (2) the effects of different measures of 
social capital and network contacts; (3) the explanatory power of cross-
country differences in the state of the economy. Finally, Millán et al. (2014) 
make a clear distinction between entrepreneurs (employers) who hire 
employees and entrepreneurs without personnel (own-account workers). 
Their work discovered different determinants for entrepreneurship survival 
in Europe in both groups with important policy implications. 
 
Regarding the literature that particularly addresses the Spanish case, 
also from a microeconomic standpoint, the pioneering work by Cueto and 
Mato (2006) examines the determinants of continuity of subsidized self-
employment activities by means of duration models in a region of Spain 
(Asturias). Their results establish that the most significant variables 
explaining survival are age, industry, and the unemployment rate. Muñoz-
Bullón and Cueto (2011) study the survival of start-up firms among former 
wage workers in Spain. With regard to their conclusions, it might be 
highlighted that a higher survival rate in self-employment is associated 
with men, prime-age workers, and individuals with higher previous labor 
turnover. Finally, Cueto et al. (2017) evaluate the impact of a Spanish 
program fostering self-employment for unemployed youth workers. The 
main result obtained is that the program has no effect in terms of survival 
rates. 
 
Now, examining the macroeconomic perspective, the work by Parker 
et al. (2012) is an example of how entrepreneurship rates might affect 
aggregate outcomes in the labor market. The authors investigate the 
hysteresis hypothesis in the rates of non-agricultural self-employment 
(entrepreneurship) for 23 OECD countries covering the period from 1972 to 
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2006. They concluded that shocks have highly persistent but not permanent 
effects on entrepreneurship. As regards the Spanish case, Congregado et al. 
(2010) analyze whether the labor market policy of encouraging unemployed 
individuals to start their own businesses is a good strategy. Their results 
suggest that very few own-account workers succeed in finding safe wage jobs 
during boom conditions so that the stock of (marginal) own-account workers 
may become too large during less prosperous phases of the business cycle 
due to a strong recession push effect. In a similar vein, Carmona et al. 
(2012) study the relationship between self-employment and output growth. 
They find that the relation between self-employment and the business cycle 
differs across two components of self-employment, that is, employers and 
own-account workers. Notwithstanding, the authors also found that 
entrepreneurship promotion policies oriented to encourage the emergence of 
new job creators may be a cornerstone of a new strategy to combat 
unemployment. In a comparative work between the US and Spain, 
Congregado et al. (2012) discovered evidence of hysteresis in the Spanish 
rate of entrepreneurship whereas there is no signal of that pattern in the 
US. Finally, Cueto et al. (2015) take into account the spatial dimension in 
the relationship between self-employment and unemployment. They argue 
that entrepreneurship activity in each region depends not only on its own 
endowment but that the entrepreneurship environment may exert some 
influence. Nonetheless, their empirical outcomes reveal that both the direct 
and indirect effects are relatively small. Anyhow, the authors also conclude 
that if unemployment grows in neighboring regions, incentives for entering 
self-employment increase, implying that there is a ‘refugee’ effect. 
 
As mentioned above, there is also emerging literature analyzing self-
employment start-up programs as a way out of unemployment by means of 
quasi-experimental designs. From an international perspective, and 
organizing the review by country, we can summarize the evaluation of these 
kinds of programs as follows. Meager et al. (2003), for the UK, carries out a 
longitudinal study of young people getting business start-up support. They 
analyze the impact of the program for the participants on the successive 
labor market outcomes. In order to do this, they applied a matching 
methodology. However, they found no evidence that entry into self-
employment (through any sort of subsidy or assistance) had a significant 
impact on the subsequent job search for participants. 
 
In the case of Germany, three papers should be highlighted. 
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) conduct a study on West Germany and 
evaluate the success of two German programs aimed at encouraging 
unemployed individuals to become entrepreneurs. Their results show that 
the two start-up proposals had a positive effect. Among other facts, they 
observe that the unemployment rate of those who participated in the 
program, at the end of its implementation, was lower than that of the people 
who remained in the control group. Caliendo (2009) examines again the 
impact of these two programs, but now for the case of East Germany (a 
region that accumulated a large amount of investment in active labor 
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market policies though with few results). The author concluded that the 
implemented program was once more successful, displaying an 
improvement in the likelihood of finding a job and in the level of earnings of 
participants. Finally, the third work of interest as regards Germany is 
Caliendo and Künn (2011). The authors touch on one of the most important 
aspects of the recent active labor market policies developed in some OECD 
countries: the transition from unemployment to self-employment. Through 
the PSM technique, and by using administrative and survey data, they 
observed that around 80% of the participants in the program received a 
comparatively higher income five years after its implementation. 
 
For the data on Argentina, Almeida and Galasso (2010) evaluate a 
self-employment program that provides financial and technical assistance. 
Their findings, in the short run, and studying non-experimental 
methodologies, do not offer conclusive results in favour of the program. On 
the other hand, for the case of Romania, Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2010) 
study the effects of four different programs. By using the PSM method 
again, these authors find some relevant results for three of the four 
programs analysed, basically, they find an enhancement in the economic 
outcomes examined for participants. Another paper of interest is 
Michaelides and Benus (2012), concerning the case of the United States. 
They perform an experimental design to study the effectiveness of giving 
self-employment training to unemployed and other individuals interested in 
self-employment. The evidence found leads us to conclude that the program, 
supported by Project GATE data, was effective, among other considerations, 
in helping the unemployed to start their own business. Lastly, it is worth 
mentioning the work of Behrenz et al. (2016) for Swedish data. Resorting to 
matching techniques (as do several of the targeted studies) and by using 
administrative data, they assess the Swedish self-employment start-up 
program. Their results reveal that the start-up subsidy program for 
unemployed individuals is a successful program as it improves the 
integration level of the unemployed in the labour market. The authors also 
noticed that this improvement was greater in the case of the unemployed 
with a low level of education. 
 
From a more general perspective, the following papers could also be 
considered. Caliendo and Künn (2014), where the authors delve into an 
issue not examined to date: the potentially heterogeneous effects of start-up 
programs across regional labor markets. They present evidence 
demonstrating that not only the process of founding and development of 
firms, but also the effectiveness of the program, are affected by the 
prevailing economic conditions at the time of the start-up. Caliendo et al. 
(2015) make special emphasis on the start-up subsidies from a business 
perspective, a question scarcely studied. For this purpose, they compare 
subsidized start-ups of people coming out of unemployment with regular 
business founders with respect to personal characteristics and business 
outcomes. Among their main results, they observed that projected 
deadweight losses linked to start-up subsidies happen on a lower proportion 
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than typically supposed. Finally, Caliendo et al. (2016) examine, by using 
thorough administrative-survey data, the importance of taking into account 
the (commonly) unobserved personality characteristics or measures in the 
evaluation process. They not only find significant positive effects in the 
return to the labor market, they observed income gains in the new program 
as well. Additionally, they note that their results, including and excluding 
these characteristics, hardly differ. Consequently, one of the key points of 
the study is the one relative to the potential or possible overestimations of 
the program’s effect when we omit these measures in these sorts of 
analyses. 
 
The third strand of literature influencing this piece of research is the 
analysis of the disincentive effects of public insurance schemes in the labor 
market. The effect of UB on the duration of unemployment spells in the case 
of salaried workers is a topic widely studied within the labor economics 
field. At the aggregate level, some papers making use of macroeconomic 
data establish a clear relationship between the generosity of UB and the 
unemployment level. Thus, for instance, Layard et al. (1991), employing 
cross-sectional data from 20 OECD countries, estimate that a 10 percent 
increase in the UB replacement rate leads to a 1.7 percent rise in the 
unemployment rate. Other studies, referring to the same group of 
industrialized countries, offer a comparable outlook. Thus, Scarpetta (1996) 
estimates an elasticity of unemployment with respect to UB of 0.13, Nickell 
(1997) finds that elasticity to be 0.11 and Bassanini (2006) equal to 0.12. 
 
The microeconomic literature is more extensive. Two articles 
reviewing the bibliography on this subject are Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1991) and Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen (2000). This early 
microeconomic literature uses cross-sectional variability in UB to draw the 
main conclusions. The empirical evidence obtained detects important effects 
of UB in the United States and UK, and weaker, or no significant effects in 
Continental Europe. Thus, in most studies for the U.S., the elasticity of 
unemployment with respect to UB is estimated to be within the range of 0.3 
to 0.9 (Holmlund, 1998). On the other hand, the disincentive effects of UB 
on the unemployment outflow rate are found to be dependent on the 
duration of the unemployment spell itself (Nickell, 1979; Fallick, 1991). 
Some classical works examining the relationship between the 
unemployment outflow rate and UB are Ham and Rea (1987), Meyer (1990) 
or Katz and Meyer (1990), for the Canadian and U.S. cases. The seminal 
works on this question for the European case are Hunt (1995), Carling et al. 
(1996) and Winter-Ebmer (1998). A common denominator in the results of 
this literature is that when the entitlement for receiving the UB 
compensation is close to expiring, the likelihood of finding a job increases 
disproportionately. 
 
After this early microeconomic literature, new developments in 
econometric techniques have tried to isolate the true causal effect by means 
of quasi-experimental econometric methodologies, such as the “differences-
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in-differences estimator” or the “discontinuity regression design”. A first 
example of this sort of work, for the U.S. case, is Card and Levine (2000). 
There are also some very relevant papers for the Nordic countries in Europe, 
like Carling et al. (2001) for Sweden, Røed and Zhang (2003) for Norway, or 
Uusitalo and Verho (2010) for Finland. Central European countries have 
also been a good “laboratory” for these types of quasi-experiments. The 
works by Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) for Slovenia, Lalive et al. (2006), 
Card et al. (2007) and Lalive (2008) for Austria, and Schmieder et al. (2012) 
for Germany are some examples of this kind of research. The main 
conclusion that may be drawn from these works is that there are significant 
effects on the unemployment duration if the replacement rate or the 
potential benefit duration (PBD) changes. As a result, and “on average”, we 
could affirm that an extension of the PBD lengthens unemployment 
duration by about 20% of such PBD time extension. On the other hand, the 
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI is estimated to be in 
the range of 0.4 to 1.0. 
 
Regarding the papers for the Spanish case, an early reference within 
this experimental or quasi-experimental literature is Bover et al. (2002). In 
this work, the authors exploit a labor reform implemented in Spain in 1984 
which legalized the use of fixed-term contracts, thereby creating a type of 
worker with much less UB benefits than those workers enjoying open-ended 
labor contracts. According to their view, this legal change produced a 
situation close to a random assignment. Their main finding, in the authors’ 
own words, is that “at an unemployment duration of three months – when 
the largest effects occur – the hazard rate for workers without benefits 
doubles the rate for those with benefits”. Secondly, Rebollo-Sanz and García-
Pérez (2015) examine the difference in the job-finding probability between 
workers who receive benefits and those who do not, for a database ranging 
from 2002 to 2007 and using the timing-of-events approach. Their results 
are that the likelihood of finding a job for a worker receiving UB is between 
10 and 20 percentage points lower than that of non-receivers for the first 
months of the unemployment spell. In an even more recent paper, Rebollo-
Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2016), using a diff-in-diff approach, find that 
reducing the replacement rate by 10 percentage points (or 17%) increases 
workers’ likelihood of finding a job by at least 41% with respect to identical 
workers not affected by the policy reform implemented on July 15, 2012. 
Such a reform reduced the replacement rate from 60% to 50% after the first 
180 days of the unemployment spell. 
 
In a nutshell: incentives clearly matter. The job-seeking behavior of 
individuals is influenced both by the level and the entitlement duration of 
UB. Our work is related to this sort of literature which makes use of 
econometric techniques that intend to get close to what would be a pure 
random experiment. However, our methodological proposal in this paper is 
slightly different. We make use of the PSM methodology to obtain the main 
results, which is a novelty in this sort of research. Furthermore, this is the 
first quasi-experimental study of a program like CAB in Europe. To the best 
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of our knowledge there is no other impact evaluation assessing the 
disincentive effects of job search behavior for self-employed workers. 
 
 
4. Database 
 
The data used in this study comes from the MCVL, as mentioned in the 
introductory section. This statistical source was created in 2004 by the 
initiative of the Secretary of State of the Social Security belonging to, what 
then was denominated, Ministry of Work and Immigration. The MCVL 
offers information regarding the population distribution for a given year 
according to different socioeconomic characteristics registered in the 
administrative records of the Social Security. By processing this 
information, it is possible to build the labor history of individuals in the 
sample, which is a key feature for the purposes of this research. 
 
The MCVL design took into account the labor population in a broad 
sense when elaborating the microdata. Individuals registered as employed 
or receiving a contributory pension from the Social Security at any time in a 
given year were included. That means that two different situations are 
taken into consideration: employed persons and pension beneficiaries. 
Moreover, and due to the methodology of the database, both situations may 
occur successively or simultaneously. Another point that has to be raised is 
that those individuals that have had a relationship with the Social Security 
administration at any time within a year (not at a given date) are borne in 
mind. Thus, it is probable that those persons with regular labor activity but 
that frequently enter or exit the Social Security records can be found in the 
database. 
 
It is also worth clarifying that the criterion to include an individual 
within the MCVL is to be actively earning income, and not so much to be 
part of the labor force in the sense of accomplishing the requirements 
established by the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, for example, 
the active population in the EU-LFS conducted by Eurostat. Four distinct 
groups might be identified (López-Roldán, 2011): (1) employed workers 
registered in the Social Security system (both wage earners and self-
employed workers); (2) Social Security payers not working (the so-called 
“special agreement”, temporary disability and recipients of non-contributory 
UB); (3) contributory pension beneficiaries (retirement, permanent 
disability), including those generated by the Obligatory Old-Age and 
Disability Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez, SOVI) and 
the survival pensions (widowhood and orphan hood); and (4) those persons 
receiving UB. In a nutshell, in the MCVL it is possible to find both economic 
active persons (according to LFS criteria) and inactive individuals (provided 
they maintain an administrative relationship with Social Security). 
 
In this research, we have made use of the MCVL 2015. We have 
checked the affiliation episodes to the RETA finished in the period 2011-
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2015. It is also noteworthy that we have focused on the “deregistrations” 
from the RETA recorded in the Model TA.05213. Our outcome variable has 
been named days until contribution (DUC) and is defined as the logarithm 
of the number of days between the “deregistration” from the RETA and a 
new registration period as a self-employed worker. The explanatory 
variables used in the study are defined below in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
As regards the design of our quasi-experiment, we have included, on 
the one hand, those self-employed workers presenting one Social Security 
registration record corresponding to the CAB compensation. These 
individuals constitute our treatment group. On the other hand, our control 
group is made up of those self-employed workers who voluntarily withdraw 
from the RETA (code 51) with no compensation associated.  
 
This second group has been selected with individuals sharing similar 
characteristics to those self-employed workers within the treatment group 
(i.e. individuals with similar features captured by means of the variables 
included in the MCVL like age, sex, industry, compensation entitlement, 
etc.), but with one difference: they do not pay contributions to the CAB 
program. 
 
 
5. Methodology 
 
The main goal of this work is to carry out an impact evaluation of a 
cessation benefit concerning self-employed Spanish workers, in order to 
determine its effects on the return to activity, measured by the variable 
DUC. The relationship between the product variable and the outcome 
variable is given by the following diagram: 
 
                                                
 
In our case, and taking into account that the allocation of individuals 
to the treatment group and the control group is not random, it is necessary 
to make use of quasi experimental designs that fix the selection bias. In this 
exercise, we apply the PSM technique. The objective of this method is to 
select a group of non-beneficiaries (self-employed workers that after 
cessation of activity do not receive benefits) that are as similar as possible to 
the beneficiaries (self-employed workers who do receive the benefit after the 
cessation of activity) except for the fact of participating in the program. 
 
                                                          
3 Model TA.0521 is the one that allows process registration, “deregistration” and application 
changes in the RETA from the Social Security records. It is available from the web page of 
the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. 
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To assess the impact of the policy, we compare the periods of 
unemployment of both groups of self-employed persons and we estimate the 
causal effect of receiving the cessation benefit. The hypothesis testing that is 
carried out is as follows: 
 
                                                                     
                                                     
 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, we would assume that a self-
employed worker with a cessation benefit would not have discrepancies in 
periods of inactivity compared to those who did not receive such support. 
The estimation of the impact of the treatment, by means of PSM, can be 
described in three stages: (1) Propensity Score estimation, i.e. the 
probability of receiving treatment; (2) assessing the common support and 
balancing test and; (3) the impact estimation (average treatment on treated 
units) and its statistical significance (Pérez and Moral-Arce, 2015). 
 
 
5.1. Estimation of the Propensity Score 
In the first step, we estimate the probability of participation in the program, 
i.e. being beneficiary, of each individual in the sample. The variable of 
participation, D, refers to the self-employed worker who receives the benefit 
after the cessation of activity and only takes two possible values. 
Furthermore, this variable depends on a set of explanatory variables 
considered relevant (see Table 5). Because of the limited nature of the 
dependent variable (participation), the model specification is the following: 
 
  
                                                                                 
 
    
      
   
      
    
                                                                          
 
where D* is the unobserved latent variable, D is the observed variable, that 
only takes two values: 1 if the individual is a beneficiary or 0 if the 
individual is not a beneficiary, X is the vector of observable explanatory 
variables and     and    are the parameters to be estimated. Assuming that 
the error term, U, follows an extreme value distribution, we estimate a logit 
model given by: 
 
         
            
              
                                                       
 
With the estimation of the parameters    and    we obtain the 
estimated probability of each individual in the sample to receive the 
cessation benefit according to the observed characteristics X. This 
probability is the so-called Propensity Score. 
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5.2. Evaluating the quality of the matching 
In this second stage, two assumptions must be tested: the "common 
support", which implies that the greater the degree of overlap between the 
treated group and the control group, the greater the quality of the impact 
estimation, and the "balancing test", assessing whether the two groups have 
similar average values in their observed characteristics. If both 
requirements are fulfilled, we would be able to guarantee that the estimates 
made through the PSM technique will have good statistical properties. 
 
 
5.3. Estimation of the average impact of public intervention using the PSM 
After estimating the Propensity Score, the impact estimator on treated units 
can be specified as the weighted mean of the difference in the outcome 
variable Y between the control and the treatment units. According to 
Heckman et al. (1997), the Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) is given by: 
    
 
  
      
             
 
   
 
   
                                            
 
where      refers to the value of the outcome variable for the beneficiaries 
of the benefit,      denotes the value of the outcome variable for those 
individuals who do not receive the program, NT is the number of individuals 
in the treatment group and        represents the weighting function, whose 
value depends on the degree of proximity between the treatment individual 
and the control individual in the estimated Propensity Score obtained 
before. For the sake of comparability, in this work three weighting options 
are used: nearest neighbor matching, radio matching and kernel matching. 
 
 
5.4. Estimation of heterogeneous effects  
After estimating the average impact, we also analyze the heterogeneous 
impact of the CAB by applying the approach developed by Lechner (2002). 
More specifically, we estimate the conditional mean of DUC depending on 
the probability of receiving the benefit. The regression in the group of 
treatment would be: 
 
                   4                                                      
 
As for the control group, we would have: 
 
                                                                         
 
                                                          
4 The abbreviation “ps” in equations (6), (7) and (8) stands for “propensity score”. 
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The impact, depending on the probability of receiving the benefit, is 
calculated by the difference between the expressions (6) and (7), 
respectively: 
 
                                                                  
 
where (                    ) is the impact of receiving the benefit until the 
return to work. These conditional expectations are estimated by means of 
non-parametric regression methods.  
 
 
6. Descriptive Analysis 
 
This section includes a set of descriptive statistics of the treatment group, 
the self-employed workers who receive the benefit, and, subsequently, of the 
two groups of interest: the treatment group and the control group. 
Regarding the former group, the most relevant information concerns the 
period they collect the cessation benefit, which is shown in Table 4. This 
table was elaborated from the data of the MCVL2015 and for the years in 
which this policy was implemented. 
 
On average, during the five years analyzed, the self-employed 
workers who subscribed to it have been receiving benefits for 116 days, 
which means, on average for the entire period of analysis, about four 
months. Moreover, the median value is 90 days. Analyzing the average 
benefit collection for each year, it can be observed that such a figure has 
been increasing as we approach the present. Thus, while in the first years it 
was just over two months, in 2015 it was around four months. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Additionally, we show the density function of the number of days that 
self-employed workers within the treatment group have been receiving some 
benefits (Figure 1). It is an asymmetrical distribution where most self-
employed workers only receive the benefit for a few months (no more than 
100 days) and only a few others manage to reach the maximum collection 
period of twelve months. Due to the asymmetry, it is satisfied that the mode 
is lower than the median and this, in turn, is below the mean. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Once the average collection period of the benefit has been examined, 
information on the endogenous and explanatory variables for the two groups 
of interest in any impact evaluation (i.e. group of control and group of 
treatment) is provided. Table 5 shows a basic summary of the variables used 
in the study, differentiating between the two groups mentioned above. It 
also incorporates the test of difference between means that allows us to 
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analyze if there are significant differences between the two groups before 
applying the matching method.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In the present case, we observe some differences in several 
characteristics of the self-employed workers such as the age of cessation of 
activity, the one regarding the time of contribution condition, the education 
level, the number of months contributed or the region of residence.  
Consequently, we do not know whether (or not) the differences 
existing in the outcome variable can be attributed to the reception of the 
benefit for the cessation of activity or to the disparities in the observed 
variables. 
 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows the nonparametric estimator of the density 
function of our outcome variable, i.e. the one on which the impact of 
receiving the benefit is analyzed (DUC). This illustration is carried out by 
differentiating between the group of treatment and the group of control. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
The vertical line indicates the average number of days that self-
employed workers receive the benefit, which are 116 days as it was 
established in Table 4. If instead of focusing on the average values we heed 
the behavior registered throughout the distribution, we find that both 
groups show remarkably different behaviors. This is so despite of the fact 
that the examination of the test of difference between means was indicating 
that there were no relevant divergences in statistical terms in the 
distribution’s central value. We can highlight that the group of self-
employed workers who do not receive the benefit need much less time to 
return to contributing, with a mode value much lower than the one 
perceived for the treatment group. Likewise, the vast majority of self-
employed within the control group return to the contribution before the 
500th day, while those who receive the benefit seem to delay the return to 
the contribution. However, this last fact is not indicative that receiving the 
benefit produces this behavior, since the exclusive effect of the program 
(receiving the benefit for cessation of activity) has not been isolated. In order 
to test whether there is a real causal effect is necessary to carry out a quasi-
experimental design as we do in the following section. 
 
 
7. Results 
 
In the first stage of the PSM, we estimate the probability of a self-employed 
worker receiving the benefit after cessation of activity as a function of a set 
of some observed variables. The dependent variable of participating in the 
program (being a beneficiary) is represented by Di, and it would equal 1 if 
the self-employed worker received the benefit and 0 otherwise. 
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From our database (i.e. MCVL2015), and using the econometric 
specifications given in (2) and (3), we get the results of Table 6, which shows 
the probit model estimation. There are several characteristics that increase 
the probability of being a beneficiary for cessation of activity, such as the 
age of retirement, the number of months of contribution, working in the 
industrial sector or having Spanish nationality, among others. On the other 
hand, there are some variables that reduce the probability of receiving the 
benefit, such as having secondary or higher education or living in certain 
Spanish Autonomous Communities (e.g. Catalonia, Murcia or Navarra). 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Taking the probit estimates as a reference, we calculate the density 
function of being a beneficiary for cessation of activity differentiating again 
between the group of treatment and the group of control. Figure 3 shows 
that most of the observations are accumulated in the low probabilities of 
receiving the benefit, with values between 0% and 40% (the common 
support of the analysis). In the same way, the balancing test is verified, so 
that we can assume there are no differences in the explanatory variables 
between both groups. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
In the second stage, we estimate the impact of the program on the 
outcome variable: DUC. This variable can be considered as duration data, 
capturing the period until the individual changes his or her labor market 
status from non-contribution to return to work (and contribution). In this 
stage, we calculate the average difference of the variable DUC using the 
information given in Figure 4. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
Making use of this information, the impact of receiving the benefit for 
cessation of activity on a self-employed worker who stops working, compared 
to the labor market situation of not receiving this payment, is given by the 
estimator (5).  
 
Table 7 shows the results of the impact estimate corresponding to the 
second stage of PSM. There is a delay in the return to work of 22 
logarithmic points, using the nearest neighbor approach, and 33 logarithmic 
points of impact with the radius and kernel methods. The results are always 
statistically significant and provide a uniform impact according to the 
observed characteristics considered (and regardless of the probability of 
being a beneficiary).  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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Looking for heterogeneity, Figure 5 disaggregates the impact 
depending on the probability of receiving the benefit when a self-employed 
worker stops the activity. Put in other words, here we follow the approach 
developed by Lechner (2002). It shows the evolution of DUC for each group 
together with the corresponding confidence intervals (95% CI). 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Figure 5 (top graph) displays the outcome variable DUC, depending 
on the probability that the self-employed worker receives the benefit when 
he or she ceases activity. The black line represents the average value of 
DUC for the group of control, depending on the probability of receiving 
benefits. We can observe that it decreases linearly, from a starting value of 
5.1 logarithmic days, for a zero probability of receiving the benefit up to 
4.80, when the probability of receiving the payment is 0.6. Nonetheless, it 
should be pointed out that from a value of approximately 0.4 onwards the 
point estimates are not very precise in statistical terms. With regard to the 
group of treatment, represented by the red line, it can be noted that for 
those self-employed workers who stop working, the value of DUC is 5.4, 
which remains relatively constant until the individuals reach a probability 
of 0.4 of receiving the benefit. Afterwards, we observe that the value of DUC 
decreases considerably, with a minimum of 4.53. Again, it ought to be noted 
that our comments are made for point estimates. Notwithstanding, the 
relevance of Figure 5 is precisely to show the confidence intervals and thus 
the statistical precision of those point estimates, and it is clear from it that 
from likelihood values of 0.35 onwards those point estimates should be 
taken with some caution. This is so since the mass of individuals there is not 
very large and point estimates are less precise. 
 
In order to study the impact of receiving benefits, it is necessary to 
analyze these figures considering a given value of the propensity. For this 
value, we compare the vertical difference between the red line and the black 
line, according to equation (8). This is the impact of receiving the benefit on 
the number of days to return to work, based on the probability of receiving 
the benefit when the self-employed person stops working. Comparing the 
vertical distance between the two lines, we detect that the impact increases 
slightly between the propensity score values between zero and 0.3. This is 
mainly because the control group regression (black line) shows a slightly 
negative trend. In other words, self-employed workers who do not receive 
the benefit, but that, according to their observed variables, were more likely 
to receive it when they ceased the activity, show a reduction in the outcome 
variable DUC. For this reason, the impact of being a beneficiary increases. 
For propensity values higher than 0.3, the impact is drastically reduced. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the self-employed workers of the group of 
treatment (red line) reduce the number of days until they go back to work. 
 
Comparing this result of Figure 5 (top graph) with respect to those 
shown in Table 7, it is possible to state that heterogeneity is an important 
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issue. As can be seen in Figure 5, the impact is far for being constant 
throughout the likelihood of being treated. In fact, the constant point 
estimate of 0.33 logarithmic points obtained in Table 7, both in the case of 
the kernel and the radius, seems to be hiding important features. In order to 
delve into this question Figure 6 and Table 8 have been elaborated.  
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In them we show the impact estimates for different probabilities 
together with their corresponding confidence intervals and the average 
impact estimate of 0.33 logarithmic points obtained in Table 7. 
 
We focus our attention within the probability (of being treated) range 
of 0.05−0.30 since between those limits is where the point estimates seems 
to be more precise and reliable according to the confidence intervals. The 
impact is estimated to be about 30 logarithmic points for low probabilities of 
being treated. However, as such probability rises also does the impact. For 
instance, for values 0.15 and 0.20 (36 and 44 logarithmic points respectively) 
the estimated impact is already higher than the average impact estimated 
in Table 7 (33 logarithmic points). What is more significant, for probabilities 
of being treated of 0.25 and 0.30 the estimated impact reaches values of 63 
and 64 logarithmic points, which practically doubles the average impact of 
0.33. This non-constant impact of the CAB on the non-employment spells of 
self-employed workers is one of the main results of our research and it has 
important policy implications that will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The central aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of a public policy: the 
cessation of activity benefit (CAB) for Spanish self-employed workers. More 
specifically here we focus on the effects on non-employment duration spells 
observed for this type of workers. In a context of budget restrictions for the 
Social Security, it seems necessary to carry out periodic evaluations in order 
to verify the effectiveness of the measures and programs implemented. In 
this regard, the impact evaluation has recently been consolidated as an 
essential tool to advise policy makers in decision-making, as well as to 
define their priorities in the future. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first impact evaluation of the CAB program for Spain. Furthermore, as far 
as we know, this is the first impact evaluation of a similar program in 
Europe. 
 
This CAB insurance system might be affected by adverse selection 
and up to three different kinds of moral hazard: (1) “ex ante incidence moral 
hazard”, (2) “ex post incidence moral hazard” and (3) “ex post duration 
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moral hazard”. For all of these reasons we would expect that those self-
employed workers being beneficiaries of the CAB experience longer non-
employment spells compared to those not entitled. This is precisely what we 
find when by means of a PSM methodology and by using the MCVL we 
inspect our data. 
 
More exactly, our results show that when we do not take into account 
heterogeneity in the treatment, self-employed workers receiving CAB 
experience non-employment spells 22 logarithmic points longer than their 
not entitled counterparts, when we adopt the nearest neighbor approach in 
the PSM procedure. When we implement the radius and the kernel 
approaches to the PSM that difference increases to 33 logarithmic points of 
impact. All these results are highly significant in statistical terms. Thus, the 
evidence obtained in this paper is quite coherent with the common result 
found in studies analyzing the effects of UB on unemployment spells for 
salaried workers. Put in other words, there is a powerful disincentive effect 
of public insurances on job-finding activities. 
 
On the other hand, our empirical work not only assesses the average 
impact of the program but also allows for heterogeneity in the treatment. 
Put another way, we follow the approach developed by Lechner (2002) and 
take into account the likelihood of participation in the program according to 
the observed individuals’ characteristics. Within the probability range of 
0.05−0.30 (in which most individuals can be found) we find an increasing 
pattern of the impact. Likewise, the impact is estimated to be around 30 
logarithmic points for low probabilities of being treated (i.e. for probabilities 
about 0.10) but that impact doubles when the likelihood of being treated is 
on the upper part of the previously mentioned limit (e.g. the impact is 
estimated to be 64 logarithmic points when the likelihood equals 0.3). 
 
In order to conclude this paper, we briefly discuss three economic 
policy implications that can be attained from our empirical work. Firstly, we 
have identified a statistically significant opportunistic behavior carried out 
by self-employed workers as a consequence of the public insurance system 
implemented in Spain. This is important since, for the first time (as far as 
we know), the well-documented strategic behavior observed for salaried 
workers has been also detected for self-employed workers. Thus, the Social 
Security administration might have to put some effort into surveillance 
activities so as to avoid fraud. Secondly, we have measured the size of the 
problem. According to our estimates non-employment spells are artificially 
prolonged on average between 22 and 33 logarithmic points by entitled self-
employed workers. Those figures might be used to calculate the financial 
cost of that opportunistic behavior. It is also important to know the 
monetary cost involved because the above mentioned surveillance activities 
are not free, and the Social Security administration ought to be efficient in 
allotting scarce resource devoted to fraud control. Finally, as it is clear from 
our outcomes that heterogeneity is an issue, and that the likelihood of being 
treated matters. We find that the impact on non-employment spells 
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increases as that probability rises. Our PSM estimates allow us to identify 
which socioeconomic factors raise the likelihood of being treated and so the 
Social Security Administration might make use of these results so as to 
target these socioeconomic groups more prone to develop an opportunistic 
behavior and, consequently, to watch them more intensively. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Limits of the benefit for the cessation of activity 
 % IPREM Euros per month 
 Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum 
General 175 80 1,087 497 
One dependent child 200 107 1,243 665 
Two dependent children 225  1,398  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Note: IPREM 2016 increased by 1/6 amounts to 621.26 Euros. 
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Table 2. Duration of the benefit for the cessation of activity 
Period of contribution 
(months) 
Period of protection 
(general case) 
Period of protection 
(>60 years old) 
From 12 to 17 2 months 2 months 
From 18 to 23 3 months 4 months 
From 24 to 29 4 months 6 months 
From 30 to 35 5 months 8 months 
From 36 to 42 6 months 10 months 
From 43 to 47 8 months 12 months 
From 48 onwards 12 months 12 months 
Source: Spanish Social Security system. 
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Table 3. Explanatory variables 
Variable Definition 
Age not registered 
Age when the individual stops being registered in the Social 
Security records within the CAB scheme. 
Over60 
Dummy variable taking value 1 when the individual has turned 
60 years old when she stops being registered in the CAB scheme 
and 0 otherwise. 
Contribution12 
Dummy variable taking value 1 when the self-employed worker 
has been paying Social Security contributions in the last 12 
months before her cessation in the CAB scheme. 
Months contributed 
Number of months contributed to the CAB scheme within the las 
4 years. 
Education 
Dummy variable taking value 1 when the individual has 
completed a secondary or tertiary educational level and 0 
otherwise. 
Male 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the self-employed worker is a 
male and 0 if she is a female. 
Spaniard 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the self-employed worker has 
been born in Spain and 0 otherwise. 
Industry 
9 dummy variables taking value 1 for the industry in which the 
self-employed workers carry out their economic activity and 0 
otherwise. The industries considered are: (1) Agriculture (and 
fishing); (2) Manufacturing; (3) Commerce; (4) Transportation; 
(5) Hostelry; (6) Computing; (7) Banking; (8) Consulting. The 
industry of reference used is a mixture of construction, 
education, health, as well as economic activities with a coding 
value higher than 88 in the Spanish National Classification of 
Economic Activities (CNAE). 
Region 
16 dummy variables for the Spanish Autonomous Communities 
(regions) taking value 1 when the individual lives in that region 
and 0 otherwise. The region of reference is Andalucía. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 4. Benefits for the cessation of activity of (treated) self-employed workers  
(number of days) 
Year 
Self-employed 
workers 
Mean 
 (Number of days) 
Standard 
deviation 
2011 4 61 2.7 
2012 56 74.4 33.4 
2013 80 118.4 47.8 
2014 103 123.3 105.7 
2015 101 133.3 119.9 
Total 344 116.4 93 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
 
  
Moral-Arce, Martín-Román and Martín-Román: Cessation of Activity Benefit 
28 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics and test of difference between means 
 
Group of control Group of treatment Test (difference in means) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Estimator p-value 
Dependent variable 
Days until contribution (DUC) 262.351 339.489 269.415 203.123 7.064 0.740 
Explanatory variables 
Age not registered 39.747 10.624 45.508 9.745 5.760 0.000 
Over60 0.036 0.187 0.069 0.254 -2.603 0.009 
Contribution12 0.084 0.277 0.126 0.333 0.042 0.030 
Months contributed 6.600 9.241 8.959 11.622 2.359 0.000 
Education 0.523 0.500 0.415 0.494 -0.108 0.000 
Male 0.654 0.476 0.598 0.491 -0.056 0.121 
Spaniard  0.766 0.424 0.890 0.313 0.124 0.000 
Industry:       
    (1) Agriculture (and fishing) 0.018 0.134 0.012 0.110 -0.006 0.436 
    (2) Manufacturing 0.053 0.224 0.077 0.268 0.024 0.074 
    (3) Commerce 0.244 0.430 0.260 0.440 0.016 0.801 
    (4) Transportation  0.032 0.176 0.041 0.198 0.009 0.367 
    (5) Hostelry  0.156 0.362 0.077 0.268 -0.078 0.008 
    (6) Computing  0.022 0.147 0.033 0.178 0.010 0.292 
    (7) Banking  0.026 0.160 0.024 0.155 -0.002 0.770 
    (8) Consulting  0.100 0.300 0.110 0.313 0.010 0.578 
    (9) Other5  0.001 0.028 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.649 
Region:       
    Andalucía 0.162 0.368 0.215 0.412 -0.053 0.028 
    Aragón  0.019 0.138 0.016 0.127 -0.003 0.597 
    Asturias 0.016 0.124 0.028 0.167 0.013 0.117 
    Baleares 0.046 0.210 0.016 0.127 -0.030 0.037 
    Canarias 0.026 0.160 0.020 0.141 -0.006 0.619 
    Cantabria 0.009 0.097 0.012 0.110 0.003 0.851 
    Castilla y León 0.033 0.178 0.000 0.000 -0.033 0.487 
    Castilla La Mancha 0.044 0.205 0.041 0.198 -0.003 0.527 
    Cataluña 0.135 0.342 0.053 0.224 -0.082 0.047 
    Comunidad Valenciana 0.121 0.326 0.089 0.286 -0.031 0.404 
    Extremadura 0.016 0.124 0.102 0.303 0.086 0.271 
    Galicia 0.040 0.197 0.008 0.090 -0.032 0.316 
    Madrid 0.075 0.264 0.053 0.224 -0.022 0.174 
    Murcia 0.021 0.144 0.098 0.297 0.076 0.065 
    Navarra 0.004 0.063 0.004 0.064 0.000 0.057 
    País Vasco 0.029 0.167 0.012 0.110 -0.017 0.792 
    La Rioja 0.004 0.063 0.033 0.178 0.029 0.974 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
                                                          
5 See: Table 3. 
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Table 6. Probit estimation. Probability of receiving the benefit for cessation of activity 
(first stage of PSM) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-stat p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Age not registered 0.0907 0.0356 2.55 0.011 0.0210 0.1604 
Over60 -0.2259 0.1541 -1.47 0.143 -0.5280 0.0762 
Contribution12 -0.2908 0.2195 -1.32 0.185 -0.7210 0.1394 
Months contributed 0.0165 0.0062 2.65 0.008 0.0043 0.0287 
Education -0.2316 0.0649 -3.57 0.000 -0.3587 -0.1045 
Male -0.1520 0.0675 -2.25 0.024 -0.2843 -0.0197 
Spaniard 0.4345 0.0933 4.66 0.000 0.2517 0.6173 
Industry:       
    (1) Agriculture (and fishing) -0.3635 0.2779 -1.31 0.191 -0.9081 0.1811 
    (2) Manufacturing 0.1841 0.1319 1.40 0.163 -0.0745 0.4427 
    (3) Commerce -0.0095 0.0830 -0.11 0.909 -0.1722 0.1532 
    (4) Transportation 0.0231 0.1778 0.13 0.897 -0.3254 0.3715 
    (5) Hostelry -0.3611 0.1185 -3.05 0.002 -0.5934 -0.1288 
    (6) Computing 0.2569 0.1946 1.32 0.187 -0.1245 0.6383 
    (7) Banking -0.2033 0.2084 -0.98 0.329 -0.6117 0.2051 
    (8) Consulting -0.0123 0.1102 -0.11 0.911 -0.2282 0.2036 
Region:       
    Aragón -0.1585 0.2448 -0.65 0.517 -0.6384 0.3213 
    Asturias 0.1403 0.2197 0.64 0.523 -0.2903 0.5709 
    Baleares -0.3392 0.2188 -1.55 0.121 -0.7680 0.0896 
    Canarias -0.0974 0.2192 -0.44 0.657 -0.5270 0.3323 
    Cantabria -0.0370 0.2924 -0.13 0.899 -0.6102 0.5361 
    Castilla y León 0.0668 0.1705 0.39 0.695 -0.2674 0.4010 
    Castilla La Mancha 0.0448 0.1500 0.30 0.765 -0.2493 0.3388 
    Cataluña -0.2560 0.1116 -2.29 0.022 -0.4747 -0.0373 
    Comunidad Valenciana -0.1404 0.1087 -1.29 0.196 -0.3534 0.0726 
    Extremadura -0.4105 0.3158 -1.30 0.194 -1.0294 0.2084 
    Galicia -0.0111 0.1515 -0.07 0.942 -0.3079 0.2858 
    Madrid 0.0318 0.1188 0.27 0.789 -0.2011 0.2647 
    Murcia -0.6097 0.3691 -1.65 0.099 -1.3332 0.1137 
    Navarra 0.6425 0.3494 1.84 0.066 -0.0424 1.3273 
    País Vasco -0.0607 0.1839 -0.33 0.741 -0.4212 0.2998 
    La Rioja -0.1434 0.5027 -0.29 0.775 -1.1286 0.8419 
Constant -2.7892 0.1872 -14.90 0.000 -3.1562 -2.4223 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Table 7. Impact estimation of receiving the benefit for cessation of activity on the variable 
DUC (second stage of PSM) 
 Nearest neighbor Kernel Radius 
Variable Impact t-stat Impact t-stat Impact t-stat 
DUC 0.220 2.643 0.332 7.255 0.338 6.880 
Individuals used in the calculations 
Treated units 
246 
N-N Control units 
229 
Kernel Control units 
4,761 
Radius control units 
3,862 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Table 8. Impact of CAB on DUC (probability of being a beneficiary) 
Class mark / Midpoint Impact [95% Conf. Interval] Average impact 
0.05 0.307 0.023 0.674 0.332 
0.10 0.269 0.085 0.437 0.332 
0.15 0.357 0.169 0.548 0.332 
0.20 0.435 0.179 0.634 0.332 
0.25 0.634 0.276 1.016 0.332 
0.30 0.638 0.350 0.924 0.332 
0.35 0.219 -0.304 0.624 0.332 
0.40 0.852 -0.171 1.880 0.332 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Number of days that self-employed workers in the group of treatment receive the 
benefit 
 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Figure 2. Non-parametric estimation of density of the variable DUC 
 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Figure 3. Probability of being a beneficiary. Non-parametric density estimation 
 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Figure 4. Information used in the calculation of the impact of receiving the benefit on the 
number of days elapsed until the return to contribution 
 
 
   Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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Figure 5. (1) Impact estimation by means of non-parametric regression of 
E(DUC|treated,ps) (top graph) and (2) non-parametric density estimation of being treated 
(receiving benefit for cessation of activity) (bottom graph) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
Note: The non-blue-shaded area corresponds to the common support. 
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Figure 6. Impact of CAB on DUC (probability of being a beneficiary) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from MCVL. 
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